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CROATIA’S STATe INDePeNDeNCe: 
BeTWeeN PRINCIPLe AND REALPOLITIK
Albert BING*
The relationship between “realpolitik” and “principle” in the context of 
Croatia gaining its national independence (after Yugoslavia’s disintegration) 
is examined at two fundamental levels. The first pertains to the exceptionally 
complex problem of the character of international relations and the 
conduct of the international community with regard to the geopolitical 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The second level peripherally 
touches upon the predisposition of Croatian intellectual and political elites 
to recognize and understand the qualitatively equally complex implications 
of the process of gaining state independence. This work has been conceived 
as a historical and political science study.
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Introduction:
In early 1993, political scientist Radovan Vukadinović stressed that the 
most important criteria for Croatia’s independence were closely tied to the 
recognition of current global processes and an understanding of the system 
of values and functioning of liberal democracies. While fully accounting for 
the circumstances of an imposed war and occupation, Vukadinović linked 
Croatia’s emergence in the international community as an independent state 
with three basic criteria: democratization, the rule of law and development 
of a free market.1 However, Vukadinović’s political overview of the process of 
gaining independence emphasized social concepts, but not the active mecha-
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1 Radovan Vukadinović, “Vanjska politika Republike Hrvatske”, Politička misao 30 (1993), no. 
3: 124-125.
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nisms and political practices of international relations.2 Historical reality is, as 
Vukadinović (an expert in international relations, and the international role of 
the United States of America in particular) certainly knew, much more com-
plex.
The time when Croatia gained its independence at the onset of the 1990s 
was marked by exceptionally complex and turbulent events: the collapse of the 
multinational Yugoslav state, the imposed war and occupation and the impera-
tive of economic and social transformation, at which time the Pandora’s box of 
the controversial historical heritage had been opened (the fifty-year influence 
of both the pro-Ustasha movement and communism). Just these ideological 
factors, which proved to be the source of numerous controversies in and of 
themselves, were sufficient to portray the state independence project as “an at-
tempt to build a ship in a stormy sea”. However, these inherent factors underly-
ing “internal” problems should be joined by the complex set of circumstances 
in the international community.
Just as Yugoslavia was disintegrating, under the influence of globalization 
and a culmination of the awareness of the advantages of European unity, 
Western Europe began to integrate, initiating a new chapter in European 
and world history. Both events proceeded in the shadow of the momentous 
collapse of communism and the dissolution of the bipolar global order.3 
The world’s leading political entities and the protagonists in the Yugoslav 
state’s disintegration were equally confronted with the interplay of these two 
historical levels in their approaches to the “Yugoslav crisis”. An additional 
factor reflected in the unfolding Yugoslav crisis was tied to qualitatively new 
phenomena in the globalization process. During the 1990s, the development of 
communication technologies signified a new step in the global integration of 
economic relations, imposing the need for a redefinition of “national interests” 
and the role of international associations. A no less important change emerged 
in the sphere of media globalization: the role of the (global) public in world 
2 Under the new circumstances, many intellectuals – Marxists virtually the day before – em-
braced the values of the West (democracy, human rights, free markets) as a substitute ideological 
canon. Even so, for experts such as Radovan Vukadinović it would be pretentious to claim that 
their appreciation of Western principles as the reference values for political interpretation was a 
simply act of ideological conversion. Besides the undoubted ideological shift from previous com-
munist “mantras” (sanctity of the image and works of Josip Broz Tito, “brotherhood and unity”, 
the ongoing revolution…) which constituted the trend of democratic “enlightenment” among 
the Croatian intelligentsia in this period, Vukadinović’s orientation equally reflected the close 
monitoring of and adaptation to social processes both in Croatia and on the international scene. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that the transition intelligentsia’s move toward the same 
thing – liberal democracy, the market economy and rule of law” was also observed by Timothy 
Garton Ash in his comparative chronicle of events in 1989; see his Mi građani: Revolucije 1989., 
Svjedočanstva iz Varšave, Budimpešte, Berlina i Praga (Zagreb: Novi liber, 1993), p. 134.
3 On this see the current observations of Dušan Bilandžić, “Civilization-Historical Problems 
of the Ex-‘Communist’ Countries”, Ivan Supek and Paolo Budinich, eds.), Encyclopedia Moderna 
36, Year XII, (1991): 5-9.
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events became an important component of “the diplomatic-political process”.4 
This was certainly reflected in various aspects of perceptions of the collapse 
of Yugoslavia, which included Croatia gaining its state independence.5 the 
transformation of the media which proceeded in the 1990s (networked global 
television, emergence of the Internet) was closely tied to the appearance of a sort 
of “acceleration of history”. The factors of a dynamic and fast-paced succession 
of events pushed phenomenon of “long duration” to the background. From the 
perspective of the media/political paradigm of focusing on “the day’s news” – 
in the early 1990s focused on the achievement of the ground-breaking victory 
of liberal democracy – few took time to consider complicated centuries-long 
processes such as the national aspirations of small nations.
The optimism which overwhelmed the West at the end of the 1980s gave 
way to increasing concern in the early 1990s over the emergence of a series of 
“retrograde” phenomena in post-communist societies, above all the reaffirma-
tion of the nationalism suppressed by the ideology of class-based universalism. 
Only rare politicians invested serious efforts in examining the consequences 
of “the end of communist/Marxist rule under the symbol of the hammer and 
sickle”. Atavistic nationalism had appeared where many had least expected it, 
in Yugoslavia. As noted by Alois Mock, the Austrian foreign minister when the 
Yugoslav crisis broke out, the national problems – “resolved only superficially, 
or suppressed” under communism – appeared in Yugoslavia, at a time when 
“the word ‘national’ in its previous sense was disappearing from the political 
vocabulary” in the countries of the developed West.6 The “aversion” to “nation-
alist aspirations”, which in their territorial (and state-building) pretensions in 
the first half of the twentieth century were often rooted in the conviction that 
“war was the natural order in the life of a nation”,7 was supplemented with an 
4 It is intriguing that the appearance of new communication technologies and their impact on 
politics in his time was also registered by Stjepan Radić: “The telegram, and even more so the 
telephone, are changing political relations among nations even more than trains are overturning 
their economic circumstances… The telegram has thoroughly overturned all previous diplo-
macy”. Stjepan Radić, Savremena Evropa ili karakteristika evropskih država i naroda (Zagreb: 
Pan Liber, 2005), p. 207.
5 The formation of value judgements in the foreign media generally proved to be an important 
albeit not decisive factor in the international recognition of Croatian independence. On this see 
Albert Bing, “Domovinski rat i inozemni mediji”, Hrvatska revija IX (2009), no. 3.
6 Alois Mock, Dossier Balkan i Hrvatska (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski insti-
tut za povijest, 1998), p. 12-14. Mock reinterpreted “the publisher of the respected daily Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, Johann Georg Reiβmüller”, who described this tendency by observing 
that “a politician – no matter where in the world – who opens some national issue or defends 
some national interest, will immediately be proclaimed a ‘nationalist’ (…)” whereby “the grada-
tion between the national and nationalist has been abolished”, Ibid., 14.
7 On this see Fritz Fisher, Savez elita – O kontinuitetu struktura moći u Njemačkoj 1871-1945. 
(Belgrade: Nolit, 1985), p. 145. It was believed that “a majority of nationalist controversies and 
political practices which appeared at the end of the twentieth century echoed those of the nine-
teenth century”.
A. BING: croatia’s State Independence: Between Principle and Realpolitik
204
almost religious attitude toward the doctrine of human rights and universal 
values exalted by liberal democracy.8
Nevertheless, for the ongoing Yugoslav crisis, the most important “retro-
grade” historical phenomenon was the renewed retreat of the United States – 
the sole remaining global superpower – to a stance of (neo)isolationism (while 
maintaining the role of global arbiter and “policeman” in regions seen as an 
American interest, such as the Persian Gulf). The only consequence of this 
turnabout, which more spontaneous than deliberate, was something of a “re-
laxation” and eschewing of “control” over international circumstances. It be-
came apparent that the collateral effect of the ‘slumber’ of “world politics” – the 
submersion of the United States into a doctrinaire vacuum after the collapse of 
bipolarity – was not simply a momentary lapse of imagination. From today’s 
perspective of global economic and political crisis, the international commu-
nity’s attitude toward the collapse of Yugoslavia may be seen as one of the first 
steps in the deepening of the contemporary civilizational rift between attempts 
to align complex global relations and particular national interests. The ques-
tion of the integrity and above all the loss of confidence in individual states and 
institutions which legitimized universal values (the system of values) as the 
components of cohesion between individual international associations (e.g. 
NATO) and the postulates of the international community’s institutions (the 
UN and human rights) were not, however, without a role. In this context, a 
historical theme relevant to the collapse of Yugoslavia (and Croatia’s state inde-
pendence) which imposed itself was the question of the relationship between 
principle and realpolitik.
A Review of the Political Context of the Relationship Between 
Principle and Realpolitik
The expectations that nations of – particularly Central and Eastern – Eu-
rope traditionally had from the “advanced West” during attempted opposition 
to totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century were generally tied to idealized 
and credulous visions of the freedom-loving principles in Western democra-
8 Influential classical liberal theorists, such as Elie Kedourie, Friedrich Hayek and Karl Popper, 
among many others in the period following the Second World War, moved toward the view that 
“nationalism [was] simply based on senseless passions and irrationality, as opposed to the ideol-
ogy of liberalism, which is grounded in reason. In other words, nationalism was rejected as ir-
rational tribalism”, Andrew Vincent, “Moć i praznina – Nacionalistička ideologija u 20. stoljeću”, 
in: Michael Freeden, ed., Političke ideologije-Novi prikaz (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2006), pp. 201-202. 
Even though such assessments were formulated under the influence of the historical examples 
of fascism, national socialism and authoritarian nationalism in general, it was believed that the 
experience of nationalism in the twentieth century was partially configured in the nineteenth 
century, and the “most nationalist controversies and political practices which appeared at the 
end of the twentieth century were simply an echo of those of the nineteenth century”. Ibid., 189, 
202.
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cies. However, the role of these principles in political decision-making mecha-
nisms are particularly distorted. For example, Mock testifies to this within the 
context of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. During the promotion of his book on 
that topic, Mock – as recounted by witnesses – expressed shame and, “with 
tears in his eyes, told the story of the UN human rights conference in Vienna 
in 1993”, at which “the West abstained from voting on the resolution which 
condemned the violation of human rights in the Bosnian war”.9 Mock actually 
testified to an entire series of episodes tied to the “Yugoslav wars” character-
ized by a confrontation between empty rhetoric and “the consistent preference 
of the West to keep its distance from the conflicts in which their direct interests 
were not threatened”.10 This historical matrix of perceptions of the relation-
ship between “principle” and “realpolitik” – recognizable in many events in 
more recent European history from Munich in 1936 to Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 – is one of the relevant observations that accompanied 
the disintegration of the Yugoslav state.11 The horror over the fate of Bosnia in 
1993 directly followed on the heels of the international public’s horror over the 
bloodshed in Croatia only a year or so earlier.
Nonetheless, the realities of international relations reflect a considerably 
more complex picture. This may particularly be noticed in historical situa-
tions in which demands appear for the dismantling of the existing geopoliti-
cal architecture, which are generally accompanied by wars and major social 
change (the case of Yugoslavia). The simplified impressions of freedom-loving 
nations who wish to be freed even of the discipline of Western democracies 
that turn their attention from any drama at a crucial moment overlook the fact 
that Machiavellianism and the revolutionary reign of terror are just as much a 
part of the European civilizational heritage as the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen.12 History has also shown on countless occasions that the 
freedom of some were often achieved through the suffering of others, which 
certainly gives rise to many dilemmas, particularly to those observing “from 
9 “Mock i Bosna: stid i suze”, Der Standard APA, 25 Apr. 1997. According to MVP-OI-
DI-110/97, 25 Apr. 1997 (Bulletin of the Croatian Foreign Ministry).
10 Sabrina P. Ramet, “Jugoslavenska kriza i Zapad: Izbjegavanje ‘Vijetnama’ i upadanje u ‘Abes-
iniju’”, 37.
11 Ibid.
12 An interesting example of hesitation surrounding the character and extent of radical social 
change is present in Marx’s earlier works (“The German Ideology”), in which individual sections 
– “where revolution becomes the model which is extolled” – are stricken; in the deleted text 
Marx “drew an apocalyptic picture of the communist revolution” in which he evoked “judge-
ment day, that day when all would culminate, the day whose dawn would redden the skies of 
cities in flames and when there would be echoes … in the midst of these ‘heavenly harmonies’ of 
the Marseillaise and Carmagnole, accompanied by the powerful and random thunder of artil-
lery, while the guillotine would set the rhythm.” Based on Jean Elleinstein, Marx – život i djelo 
(Zagreb: Globus, 1986), p. 64.
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the sidelines”.13 The “rivalry”, just like the “intermingling”, between these two 
“antipodes” – universal principles of freedom and parochial interests (nations 
or social classes) – is one of the primary drivers of contemporary European 
and world history. The search for effective mechanisms to curtail this clash 
and strike a balance in international relations is a subject that has quite often 
been differently evaluated, particularly given the various “interest” perspec-
tives of individual national histories. For many small nations, such as Croatia 
– burdened by an eternally unfree and traumatic past – the concepts and laws 
underlying this search are scarcely discernable, because they demand consid-
eration of very diverse viewpoints and the perspective of a broader historical 
context.14
Until the end of the First World War (by which time contemporary na-
tions had been formed), small nations were not consulted in the course of 
vital geopolitical decision-making. The creation of modern nations and na-
tion states in the nineteenth century was accompanied by new doctrines for 
international relations. The greatest impact on European political history in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century was exerted by the balance of power 
politics of Germany’s “Iron Chancellor”, Otto von Bismarck of Prussia, whose 
realistic postulates for international politics crushed the moral constraints of 
post-Napoleonic Europe. Bismarck’s realpolitik was founded on “the notion 
that relations among states are determined by raw power and that the mighty 
13 An additional question that burdens the relationship between principles and political prag-
matism is the divergence between the views of a distant observer (an analyst who views events 
from a post festum perspective) and participants in these events. As opposed to an analyst, a 
statesman is forced to judge and make decisions in real time, and his decisions have significant 
consequences to the fate of the individuals and communities to which they pertain. On these 
problems, see Helmut Plesner, Granice zajednice – Kritika društvenog radikalizma (Sremski Kar-
lovci/Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 2004), p. 123.
14 One may speak of the beginnings of contemplation of the realpolitik/principle dichotomy in 
Croatia in the broader context of the preoccupations of public personalities in the nineteenth 
century. Ante Starčević dealt with this problem in his own unique way (primarily from the 
standpoint of articulating Croatian national interests); however, his “state-right scholarship”, 
with which he wanted to promote Croatian national and state sovereignty, resulted in a broad 
range of diverse – often even diametrically opposed – interpretations of his thought (Mile 
Starčević, Kerubin Šegvić, Jovan Skerlić, Josip Horvat, Vaso Bogdanov, Mirjana Gross, Tomislav 
Ladan…). The first “qualified” Croatian political scientist, Stjepan Radić, was much more specif-
ic. In his study entitled ‘Modern Europe, or the Characteristics of European States and Nations’, 
written in 1905, Radić synthesized Croatian national aspirations with the theoretical and his-
torical knowledge he acquired over many years of careful study of the development of European 
politics and culture. While examining the specificities of European nations and phenomena 
within this context such as “nationalism”, “patriotism”, and “militarism” (as manifestations of 
particular interests), Radić also dedicated his attention to questions of the universal “principles” 
vital to the development of European political culture; noting that “clear and consistent ideas 
or principles become (…) and remain the primary factor in European international law itself ”, 
he – in line with his ebullient and optimistic character – concluded that “there are no respectable 
people and nations without principles”. From Stjepan Radić, Savremena Evropa ili karakteristika 
evropskih država i naroda (Zagreb: Pan Liber, 2005), p. 125.
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will prevail”.15 Building on the French concept of raison d’état and Metternich’s 
“Concert of Europe” and the “Holy Alliance” of the first half of the nineteenth 
century,16 realpolitik was not simply an expression of predatory and narrow 
interest-based politics, but rather a coherent foreign policy which aimed at a 
balance of power and international stability. During the time of Bismarck and 
his contemporaries, the basis for international policy was a rational assessment 
of the power relations of responsible statesmen, whose prudence was rooted in 
the harmonization of desires and possibilities.17 Bismarck’s well-known maxim 
that “politics is the art of the possible” underscored the importance of accurate 
assessments of power in international relations as opposed to the search for 
often unreliable allies (as shown, for example, by the Balkan Wars) and the ref-
erence to pseudo-moralistic platitudes used to legitimate force. However, more 
than politicians before and particularly after his time, Bismarck was aware that 
force without legitimacy provoked constant contests to measure power, while 
legitimacy without force resulted in a mere posturing.18
A new meaning was given to the relationship between the principle and 
realpolitik in the twentieth century by the new world power, the United States. 
At a time of increasingly frequent crisis situations between the European great 
powers that would result in the outbreak of the First World War, two Ameri-
can paradigms crystallized that would mark the entire twentieth century and 
beyond to the present. US President Theodore Roosevelt, otherwise a Nobel 
15 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacija (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2000), p. 90.
16 Raison d’état is a foreign policy concept advocated and implemented by Armand Jean du 
Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, the first minister of French King Louis XIII. This doctrine is 
based in the fact that “the welfare of the state justifies whatever means employed may further 
it”, and “the national interest supplanted the medieval notion of universal morality”. Although 
a Catholic clergyman, Richelieu placed French national interests above religious ends (which 
by means of Catholic universalism justified the universal reign of the Holy Roman Empire, 
in Richelieu’s time headed by Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand II). The aim of raison d’état is the 
struggle for political predominance or establishment of a balance that secures stability in the 
international order. As noted by Henry Kissinger, raison d’état set “the fundamental principles 
for the conduct of nations, but did not provide any answer to the challenges of the world order”. 
Ibid., 49, 50, 56. On Metternich’s concept of international politics, see also pp. 67-80. See also 
Henry A. Kissinger, Obnovljeni svijet – Metternich, Castlereagh i problemi mira 1812-1822 (Za-
greb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1976).
17 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacija, 105.
18 Power was the means to achieve an objective, and not an end to achieved unlimited power, 
according to Bismarck’s art of self-restraint, which was an essential attribute of the prudent 
statesman. Thus, threats of war did not necessarily lead to war but rather to political compro-
mise, while the result would be a balance of power that fosters international stability. This “self-
restrained” statesmanlike nuance was missing from Bismarck’s successors. In the early twentieth 
century, the threat of using force as the sole criteria for resolving disputes would drive the Euro-
pean powers to an arms race and confrontational politics, even though there was no particular 
reason for this. The resulting loss of control in maintaining the balance of power and the avoid-
ance or limitation of conflict led to two World Wars which brought the entire world to the brink 
of cataclysm. Ibid., 66.
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Peace Prize laureate, rejected disarmament, just then emerging as an interna-
tional topic, and he unhesitatingly disavowed the efficacy of international law. 
The essence of his opinion on the features of international law was something 
of an Americanization of Bismarck’s realpolitik philosophy for which moral 
consensus was only justified as an aspect of power.19 Considering the relation-
ship between altruistic moralist initiatives and the reality of increasingly likely 
confrontations between the great powers, Roosevelt concluded that “what a 
nation could not protect by its own power could not be safeguarded by the in-
ternational community” and that “a milk-and-water righteousness unbacked 
by force is to the full as wicked as and even more mischievous than force di-
vorced from righteousness”.20
This manifestation of American self-awareness continued with an unex-
pected shift in the promotion of American might rooted in a diametrically 
opposed concept. After bringing the United States in to the World War, Wood-
row Wilson became the most important arbiter of the Entente’s wartime aims 
and imposed the view that “universal law and not a balance [of power], na-
tional trustworthiness and not accentuation” should become the foundation 
of the international order21 More accurately, Wilson proposed the defence of 
the international order with the help of the moral consensus of peace-loving 
nations, whereby he introduced a new concept to international relations: col-
lective security (initially embodied in the League of Nations). Rejecting “the 
measures of national selfishness which once steered national alliances”, Wilson 
demanded that (these measures) “give way to a new order of things that will 
pose only these questions: ‘Is it good?’, ‘Is it just?’, ‘Is it in mankind’s interest?’”22 
This “crusading” move to promote universal moral criteria after the American 
entry in the European war closed the book on a century of European world 
dominance and “opened a new era in European civilization”.23
The entire twentieth century was characterized by both antagonism be-
tween and intermingling of Roosevelt’s realistic and Wilson’s idealistic doc-
trines in American foreign policy, while the influence of the latter American 
president’s ideas would become a guiding light for small nations. The World 
Worlds introduced a catastrophic dimension to the notion of the balance of 
power (these events initiated in Europe prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski to de-
scribe the twentieth century as the “era of European civil war”).24 In the 1930s, 
the ideologies of communism and particularly national socialism – whose 
“policy objectives (…) were irrational and unlimited” – solidified the view that 
the main substance of realpolitik was a compromise with ethical principles 
19 Ibid., 114.
20 Ibid., 33.
21 Ibid., 37.
22 Ibid., 43.
23 A. J. P. Taylor, From Sarajevo to Potsdam (London: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), p. 42.
24 According to Krsto Cviić, Pogled izvana (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod znanje, 1994), p. 32.
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(the “ideological end” justifies the “objectionable means”).25 During the latter 
half of the twentieth century, marked by the crumbling of colonial empires 
and the Cold War, the ideas of political and national emancipation became 
the motive for a more just reorganization of the world. Thus, the idea of na-
tional self-determination, which was adopted by Franjo Tuđman as a major 
tenet of his politics at the end of the 1980s (in its Leninist variant), became 
the principle in which small nations recognized an opportunity to gain state 
independence, which was (often uncritically) equated with freedom. The ap-
portionment of power and responsibilities for global affairs between large and 
small nations, enshrined in the United Nations, was based on the idea that 
acceptance of shared values – universal moral precepts – would downplay the 
difference between nations and eliminate the causes of conflicts. This philoso-
phy of international relations would become the foundation of the collective 
security system which remains in place to this day.26 However, at a time when 
there was an expectation of “Yugoslavia’s integration into the new spirit of a 
transformed world”, as stated by one of the chroniclers of that country’s last 
days, “the burden of the Serbian national platform” proved to be the source 
of discord which “threatened the integrity of the country and undermined its 
international status”; the Yugoslav question “ever more seriously also became 
a question of European security and stability…”27
The International Community and Internationalization (escalation) 
of the Yugoslav Crisis
Regardless of the conduct and motives of individual Yugoslav nations in 
the process of that country’s disintegration, the genesis of the Yugoslav crisis 
clearly underlined the reticence of the most important exponents of global 
policy to confront these challenges, which jeopardized the international com-
munity’s very foundations. This generated a realpolitik-inspired detachment 
25 Eric Hobsbawm, Doba ekstrema (Zagreb: Zagrebačka naklada, 2009), pp. 138-139. On the 
influence of ideology in communism (as the older source of totalitarianism) Hobsbawm, him-
self a communist, observed: “The idea that the socialist state should force every citizen to think 
the same, let alone endow its leaders collectively with something like papal infallibility (that any 
person should exercise this function was unthinkable), would not have crossed the mind of any 
leading socialist before 1917”. Ibid., 331.
26 The dilemmas which ensued from the new system of relations (which in line with the self-
determination of nations considers the disintegration of multinational states either a legitimate 
act or contests them) still constitute an open chapter of European and world history. For a cur-
rent debate on this topic, see, for example, Zoltan Bagdy “Protecting Minorities in the Former 
Yugoslavia: Kosovo and vojvodina”, 1 March 2008; in this article, Bagdy criticizes the views 
on national self-determination put forth by political scientist and journalist, “The Conse-
quences of Kosovo”, The Washington Post, 19 February. See http://www.americanhungarianfed-
eration.org/news_LTE_KosovoSelfDeterminatin.htm Accessed online, 27 July 2011.
27 Hido Biščević, Strategija kaosa (Zagreb: CIP, 1989), pp. 184-185.
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from the values incorporated in the institutions of the international commu-
nity and the emergence of a “negative” opportunism aimed at the unprincipled 
concealment (transfer) of blame for the failure to adhere these principles.28 
This tendency brought into question the very purpose of the international 
community’s security mechanisms. The Conference for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE) in 1989 and the Paris conference of all European 
nations, the United States and Canada on 19 November 1990 set the politi-
cal framework within which social consolidation based on a more accurate 
determination of the new role of nation states was supposed to proceed. The 
specification of ownership and entrepreneurial relations, human and minor-
ity rights and a series of complex procedural matters clearly laid down the 
guidelines for establishing the supranational framework that would overcome 
national particularism while simultaneously reifying the particular interests of 
smaller units such as regions. All of these guidelines stood in stark contrast to 
the simultaneously deteriorating political events in Yugoslavia, as well as the 
changes in international relations reflecting in the “new” status of principle 
and realpolitik.
At a time characterized by affirmation of a supranational interest frame-
work and regional entities like the European Community, as well as expan-
sion of global multiculturalism, the question of national emancipation that 
appeared in the post-communist world was not met with sympathy in the 
countries of the advanced West. Fear of geopolitical fragmentation of the East-
ern Bloc after the collapse of bipolarity and the general erosion of commu-
nism were important factors in perceiving the character of newly-awakened 
nationalisms. As picturesquely noted by Sabrina Petra Ramet, “the paranoia 
of nationalism” appeared everywhere in south-east Europe after 1987; it mani-
fested itself “in Dedijer’s wild-eyed howling about the Vatican-Comintern 
conspiracy against the Serbs; in Csurka’s frantic warnings about the capitalist-
Jewish-Masonic conspiracy against the Hungarians; in the occasional sermons 
of Zhirinovsky on the need of all Slavs to unite in self-defence; in the frequent 
articles on Germany as the “Fourth Reich” published in Milošević’s press in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s …”29
Briefly, the general phenomenon of “nationalist cacophony” was seen in 
the West (indicated in Mock’s aforementioned observations) as a factor of de-
stabilization that could threaten to Balkanize the entire world. These changed 
international circumstances resulted in changes in the political priorities of 
28 “Positive” opportunism is an aspect of realpolitik (“politics as the art of the possible”) which 
brings together opposing political options that share no values, but still finds compromise solu-
tions despite their differences. “Negative” opportunism implies the undercutting of the princi-
ples upon which a given community is based and the loss of integrity.
29 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Postkomunistička Europa i tradicija prirodnoga prava (Zagreb: Alinea, 
2004), p. 58.
Review of Croatian History 7/2011, no.1, 201 - 231
211
the most important global protagonists. The “New World Order”, much touted 
by the elder President George Bush in 1991, was no longer concerned with a 
formerly important American ally, Yugoslavia.30 The proclamation of the free-
dom-loving principles whereby the United States furthered its international 
interests during the Cold War were replaced by a new messages that complied 
with changes in foreign policy priorities. This phenomenon was observed in 
1991 by Croatian-American scholar Mate Meštrović, elaborating the dual na-
ture of US foreign policy (in relation to the Yugoslav context of the time):
“This is the contradictory American self-image: the confrontation between 
egoism and idealism. As the leading superpower, the US aspires to global 
domination, which it often exercises with a measure of restraint, but is 
sometimes prepared to affirm itself in a ruthless war, as recently in the 
Persian Gulf. At the same time, the US is deemed the ‘land of the free and 
the home of the brave’, the beacon of global democracy and the capitalist 
economic system whose ‘manifest destiny’ is to promote the interests of 
democracy and capitalism throughout the world. The conflict between 
the United States as a superpower which implements the realpolitik of 
its own strategic, military and economic interests (even though there are 
disputes in the US over what these interests actually are) and America 
as the standard-bearer of freedom, democracy and human rights, 
incorporated in the policies which Washington conducted with regard 
to Yugoslavia, creates constant tensions and contradictions. The State 
Department strenuously advocated the preservation of the unity and 
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, which it believes are an ‘interest’ of the 
US, while simultaneously demanding that democracy and human rights 
be observed, that the rule of law and market economies be established”.31
According to some interpretations, such conduct was not a result of the West’s 
“betrayal” and hypocrisy, but rather a structural shortcoming in the edifice of 
Western civilization: the fall of communism and the efforts to restore plural-
ism in Eastern Europe proceeded at a time when,
“under the influence of Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl and other governments, 
the West – and especially the US – was rapidly moving from democracy to 
plutocracy, essentially changing the Western model of ‘pluralism’. Viewed 
in this light, the transition from single-party socialism to plutocratic 
capitalism did not promise the achievement of the liberal project, but 
rather the certainty of another betrayal (where communism would have 
30 After the end of bipolarity, “communism and the division of the world in to blocs, the two 
strongholds of Tito’s project and the entire idea of Yugoslavia”, became a historical relic to the US 
and the West; here no attention was accorded to that fact that these “external frameworks” were 
also in “the service of internal policy”. From Tvrtko Jakovina, Treća strana Hladnog rata (Zagreb: 
Fraktura, 2011), p. 13 (from the foreword by Hido Biščević).
31 Mate Meštrović, “Zapad u šoku”, Danas, 9 July 1991.
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been the ‘first’) – truly this betrayal was even more painful, because the 
Western plutocrats continue to cite old truisms, even though they no 
longer adhered to these themselves”.32
Even though reports from US intelligence agencies clearly forewarned 
the collapse of Yugoslavia and possible dire consequences (including desta-
bilization of the international community),33 the US policy-makers were not 
particularly impressed. The efforts Yugoslav statesmen (Ante Marković, Stj-
epan Mesić, Franjo Tuđman, Borislav Jović, Aleksandar Prlja and others) to 
draw American attention in 1990 yielded no results (besides vague support 
for Prime Minister Ante Marković). When it became apparent that events in 
Croatia and Yugoslavia had spun out of control in the spring of 1991 (Plitvice, 
Borovo Selo…), American restraint reached an extreme. In June 1991, US Sec-
retary of State James Baker responded to the declarations of independence by 
Slovenia and Croatia with the Pythian statement that the US upheld the ter-
ritorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia, but “will not support the use 
of force in the preservation of Yugoslavia”; the message that the US, “insofar 
as it is forced to choose between unity and democracy, will always choose de-
mocracy” did not mean much, since there was nothing to indicate the criteria 
for “democratic standards”, and even less to indicate which steps the US would 
possibly take as effective measures to support or sanction those who accept or 
ignore “democracy”.34 Baker’s stance did, however, complement the statement 
made by the NATO supreme commander, John Galvin, who simply stated that 
“Yugoslavia does not lie within NATO’s defensive sphere and therefore NATO 
will not intervene in a war there”.35
This stance by the Americans confirmed the observations made by indi-
viduals such as Meštrović. In the approach of the US, which thinks of itself as 
a “pillar of democracy”, to the case of Yugoslavia, the democratic principles 
and human rights which legitimize its “democratic nature” were relegated to a 
demagogic veneer behind which no real thought was given to citing “national 
interests” and using them to justify the disavowal of universal principles. The 
actual phenomenon of the “Wilsonian paradigm” was subjected to numerous 
analyses. Thus, one Croatian-American scholar with an anti-liberal outlook, 
Tomislav Sunić, in an article with the intriguing title “Woodrow Wilson is at 
war in Croatia” (1992), “revealed” Wilsonianism as a doctrine which proved 
disastrous for small nations like the Croats: “Woodrow Wilson’s program for 
32 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Postkomunistička Europa i tradicija prirodnoga prava (Zagreb: Alinea, 
2004), p. 26.
33 Tvrtko Jakovina, “Tajni izvještaji CIA-e o Hrvatskoj”, “Bit će krvavog nasilja i etničkih pre-
seljenja”, Globus, 15 Dec. 2006.
34 Warren Zimmermann, Yugoslavia: 1989-1996, Conference Report U.S. and Russian Policy-
making with Respect to the Use of Force, Published by RAND 1996, p. 7.
35 Based on Sabrina Petra Ramet, “Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding ‘Vietnam’ and Blun-
dering into “Abesinia”, East European Politics and Societies 8 (1994), no. 1:189-219.
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the self-determination of the European nations could not function from the 
very start. First, because the principle of national self-determination could not 
be stopped with the Poles, Czechs and Serbs, rather it had to include the Su-
detan Germans, the Hungarians and the Croats. In his desire to create a new 
European order by creating hybrid centralist-Jacobin states such as Yugoslavia, 
Wilson’s global democracy paradoxically led to the worst sort of nationalism. 
And Croatia is still paying the price for Wilson and Yalta”.36 More important 
than Sunić’s analysis are his observations which testify to the drastic waning 
Croatian enthusiasm for democratic values and the consequent growth of the 
post-(neo)communist phenomenon of global conspiracy (as a substitute for 
the previous collusion between “external and internal adversaries”):
“What disappointment ensued when the Croatian appeals for recognition 
of Croatia, conveyed to the Americans, were met with indifference! 
Who could have thought that the country which for two centuries had 
stood at the defence of democracy to the last breath would uphold the 
idea of Yugoslavia and in the process ignore the new geopolitical reality 
in the Balkans. The disappointment was all the greater because the new 
geopolitical reality did not emerge due to a foreign invasion of Yugoslavia, 
but rather due to domestic democratic elections. A considerable number 
of Croats today rationalize the Serbian aggression against Croatia by 
claiming that America intentionally betrayed Croatia, that the dark forces 
of the Trilateral Commission, the Freemasons, and various ‘Serbian and 
Jewish lobbies’ wanted to prevent Croatia’s independence at all costs.”37
The pragmatic American “abandonment” of Wilsonianism, which 
maintained for a century that “the security of America is the security of all 
mankind”/“America is the sole idealist nation in the world”38 – was less shock-
ing to actual Americans (who live the ambivalence of American values)39 than 
to the denizens of the post-communist states which idealized the ‘free world’ 
and America during the Cold War. In this context, the relevant historical motif 
associated with the disintegration of Yugoslavia may be observed via the con-
duct of “American leaders” who “failed to see that they cannot preach demo-
cratic values and betray them at the same time, without destroying the very 
idea of democracy itself ”.40 Historian Ivo Banac caustically summarized U.S. 
policy at the beginning of the 1990s in the territory of the then already former 
Yugoslavia:
36 Tomislav Sunić, “Woodrow Wilson ratuje u Hrvatskoj”, Nova Matica, no. 1, 1992, p. 16.
37 Ibid.
38 Based on Peter Scowen, “Crna knjiga Amerike”, Izvori (2003): 220-221.
39 On this, see, e.g. Richard Hanley, ed., South Park i filozofija (Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 2008).
40 Ibid., 221.
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“The United States actually has no specific Yugoslav policy. It goes 
without saying that the superficial nature and cynicism of US policy, 
obsessed with Yugoslavia as an integral state, ignoring the centrifugal 
force of national movements and post-communism in general, revering 
the golden calf of ‘stability’ with Ante Marković playing the role of Bush’s 
beloved Gorbachev, and relying on the ‘Yugo-expertise’ of certain key 
officials in the Bush administration, have contributed to expansion of the 
conflict, legitimization of the unconstitutional pretensions of the YPA, 
marginalization of anti-imperialist forces in Serbia and Montenegro, 
and the bloodshed and aggression in Croatia. This is the bottom line of 
Bush’s opportunistic policy. If opportunism, in the positive sense, means 
adaptation to newly-emerging conditions, then the Bush administration 
has fallen short even in its principles. The fact that these virtual dwarves 
are now administering foreign policy in what is now the world’s sole 
superpower is actually unbelievable.”41
But the consequence was not just an erosion of credibility. After the out-
break of war in Croatia and increasing public discontent, American prevari-
cation was replaced with “proactive criticism”. However, the very harshness 
of this criticism proved counterproductive, for rather than clarity, it demon-
strated how shallow and disoriented American policy was, and this was duly 
and astutely registered by the media.42 The empty moralistic homilies scarcely 
concealed the underlying hypocrisy, leaving the impression of a failed attempt 
to compensate for the lack of post-Cold War vision. One of the signs of this 
American disorientation was the a priori negative response to any question of 
geopolitical change (the failure to distinguish between the motives of libera-
tion-oriented and autocratic state-building).43 When, in early August 1991, US 
President George Bush (the elder) delivered a speech to the Ukrainian parlia-
ment (Ukraine was, otherwise, one of the first countries to recognize Croatia’s 
independence), he compensated the absence of a principled American position 
on the Yugoslav crisis by blaming it on atavistic Balkan nationalistic passions: 
“Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace 
a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote 
a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred… We can see in Yugoslavia how 
41 Ivo Banac, “Američki patuljci spašavaju Jugoslaviju!,” Globus, 6 Mar. 1992.
42 Anthony Lewis, “Where Is the Outrage”, The New York Times, 4 Nov. 1991; “American abdi-
cation in Europe” (Editorial, The New York Times, January 11, 1992); Strobe Talbot, “Fiddling 
While Dubrovnik Burns”, Time, 25 Nov. 1991; Patrick Buchanan, “A new indifferent order, U.S. 
taking a back seat”, Washington Times, 25 Sept. 1991, etc.
43 Peter Scowen noticed that “hypocrisy is the most corrosive substance in the world: it can 
eat through the patina of national ideals faster than rust can pass through an old Buick. When 
the United States betray freedom in Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala, Iran or in countless other de-
veloping countries ruled by brutal despots who exploit anti-communism and anti-terrorism as 
shiny bait to secure American support or arms, this corrodes the very concept of the American 
style as a superior way of life”. Peter Scowen, Crna knjiga Amerike, p. 221.
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the proud name of nationalism can splinter a country into a bloody civil war”.44 
This interpretation, simplified to the point of banality, was deepened by ob-
servations that directly referenced the question of tying national interprets 
(reduced to chauvinistic nationalism) and state-building aspirations. As later 
noted by Mark Almond, it became apparent that “George Bush will be seen as 
a last defender of the status quo… trying to be a rock of stability in a changing 
world… In the history books alongside the Monroe and Truman doctrines. 
Bush preached a clear faith: states should neither be destroyed, nor created”.45 
Although politicians – even when they hold posts as important as the presi-
dency of the most influential country in the world – are not expected to deal 
with complex questions of political philosophy like the self-determination of 
nations (i.e., ‘the Janus-like nature of self-determination’) and state formation, 
today’s historical hindsight confirms that the line between principles and their 
demagogic rationalization can indeed be fine. The unfolding Yugoslav crisis 
showed that a relatively unjust outcome (which was expected under the real-
politik scenario after the victory of the unmatchable superiority of the Yugoslav 
People’s Army and Milošević) was not an alternative to an even bloodier war, 
but rather its guarantor.
After “James Baker’s half-hearted efforts in Belgrade”, the US “made it clear 
it regarded consider Yugoslavia as Europe’s problem”.46 This European resigna-
tion by the US appeared at a time of triumphal validation of European unity; 
the twelve members of the European Community announced the formation 
of the European Union, directly aimed at establishing a common market (the 
largest in the world) and the planned development of institutions to conduct a 
common foreign policy and create joint security mechanisms. The hand-over 
of the problem to Europe occurred at the moment when the Yugoslav crisis 
grew into the first armed conflict on European soil since World War II. Despite 
this, Europe, full of enthusiasm, took up the challenge; moreover, this occasion 
“presented the historic challenge that Europe needed to prove its singleness 
of purpose. In a phrase that would haunt him, Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s 
Foreign Minister, declared: ‘The age of Europe has dawned’”.47 While Italian 
Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis said of the more active engagement by 
the Europeans that the EC “would be briefing the Americans on its activities, 
but not consulting them”, Poos was even more unequivocal: “If one problem 
could be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a Euro-
pean country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else”.48
44 President Bush in a speech to Ukrainian Parliament, 8/1/1991, according to Paula Franklin 
Lytle, “US Policy toward the Demise of Yugoslavia”, East European Politics and Societies (Fall 
1992): 310-311.
45 Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War (London: Mandarin Paperback, 1994), p. 37.
46 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Smrt Jugoslavije (Opatija: Otokar Keršovani, 1996), p. 154.
47 Ibid.
48 Interview with Gianni de Michelis in Borba, 17 May 1991; Jacques Poos, then the president 
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Just how ready was Europe to lock horns with the Yugoslav problems? The 
outbreak of armed conflict in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1991 led to the as-
sessment “in European capitals, Paris most of all (…) that its disintegration 
would not only influence, and perhaps even threaten, this ‘colourful country’, 
but also European stability”; despite this, the European “twelve” demonstrated 
no commitment to aligning the Yugoslav political realities with the principles 
they advocated in promoting European unity. Croatian journalist Mirko Galić 
picturesquely recounted the attitude of EC representatives on the escalation of 
the Yugoslav crisis:
“Nothing in history can be proven before it happens; because of this the 
‘twelve’ want to influence the outcome of the crisis in Yugoslavia with 
their unconcealed and repeatedly emphasized priority: a ‘unified’ and 
‘democratic’ Yugoslavia. A cynic would say that Mitterrand, Kohl, Major, 
Andreotti and other statesmen of the ‘great Europe’ ate Yugoslavia for 
dinner. Since the regular portion of the summit was prolonged, because 
Saddam Hussein was too much of a mouthful to be masticated in only 
two hours of debate, Yugoslavia received its five minutes under the 
crystal chandeliers of Senningen Castle, between the artichokes and veal 
cutlets. While heading off to dinner, Jacques Delors [then president of 
the European Commission] caused some consternation when he said the 
Yugoslav ‘meal’ was only on the menu of the foreign ministers. After the 
heads of state (and prime ministers) had dessert and boarded their planes, 
Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Santer corrected Delors: Yugoslavia 
was ‘served’ at the main table. So much so that it can be said that that the 
European Community sent the ‘federal government’ in Belgrade a ‘clear 
signal’ that it can count on associate membership only ‘if it preserves 
its unity and territorial integrity’. The position on Yugoslavia did not, 
therefore, change, rather it was reinforced and raised to the highest level 
of the top officials in the twelve European states. Everything that the 
‘Troika’ told Jović, Marković and Lončar was reiterated at the summit in 
Luxembourg – that borders had been set in Europe, that borders are a 
‘very sensitive political matter’ and that ‘there is no good reason for a 
new discussion of borders’; Yugoslavia may count on Europe only if it is 
‘unified’ and ‘democratic’. ‘I think the message has been understood’, the 
Luxembourg minister said”.49
Several days later, Delors used entirely different words to describe the Eu-
ropean engagement in solving the Yugoslav crisis: “I see the Yugoslav trag-
edy as evidence that Europe does not exist as a foreign policy subject”.50 This 
of the EU Council of Ministers in a statement to Independent Television Network, 27 June 1991 
(quoted in Marc Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 32).
49 Mirko Galić, Pet minuta za Jugoslaviju, 15 Apr. 1991.
50 Interview with Jacques Delors, Le Mond, 1 July 1994. From: Ljubomir Čučić, ed., Hrvatska 
i Europa-Europski identitet i perspektive europske integracije – prilog raspravi (Zagreb: Europski 
pokret Hrvaske, 1997), p. 13.
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damning assessment indicates several historically relevant motifs. Observa-
tions made by German diplomat Geert-Hinrich Ahrens indicate the extent to 
which Europe’s options were actually limited: “Conflict management in the 
internal problems of a third country was, at the end of the eighties, beyond the 
horizon of experience for the EC member-countries. During the Cold War, 
political, let alone military, interference by the EC in such a sensitive East-
West field of competition as Yugoslavia was unthinkable. Existing instruments 
– political contacts and economic assistance – were not suited for a crisis of 
such dimensions. Modern international concepts such as pre-conflict peace 
building, preventive deployment of foreign military forces, or a ‘responsibility 
to protect,’ had not yet been developed, and could not yet be the basis of the 
international intervention in Yugoslavia”.51 In addition, “Yugoslavia was not 
the highest international priority. The impending disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the first Iraq war, and developments in the EC and the newly reunited 
Germany commanded more attention than the signs on the wall in Yugoslavia. 
For all these reasons, it was not surprising that that originally the international 
community, including a majority of the EC member-states, did not wish to 
engage themselves in the Yugoslav quagmire. Some, ignoring predictions, pre-
ferred an ostrich policy, hoping that the crisis would go away by itself, and, in 
general, the political will to frame an effective policy was absent”.52
However, the reasons for the failure of Europe (and the international 
community) to reign in the war may also be considered from the standpoint 
of principle. The idea of integration of European countries was rooted not only 
in interest-based links, but also a common system of values, which was largely 
becoming a component of global cohesion;53 one of the central premises of 
European unity was articulated in numerous documents, which underscore 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as common values.54 However, while 
Europe and the international community were setting down the postulates 
for human rights – as, among other things, the foundations “of peace and 
security which crucially contribute to the prevention of conflict” – conflicts 
and violations of human rights were escalating in Yugoslavia.55 The absence of 
51 Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge-Containment of the Ethnic Conflict and the 
Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Washington, DC/Baltimore, MD: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), p. 487.
52 Ibid., 486.
53 Thus Jürgen Habermas noticed that “Christianity and capitalism, the natural sciences and 
technology, Roman law and the Napoleonic Code, the bourgeois/urban lifestyle, democracy 
and human rights and secularization of the state and society expanded to other continents”, and 
that these “achievements no longer signify [solely European] features”. Jürgen Habermas, Eseji o 
Europi, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2008, 126.
54 On this see Thomas Buergenthal, Međunarodna ljudska prava (Zagreb/Budapest: Hrvatski 
Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava and Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute, 1997), pp. 
154-155.
55 Ibid., 155.
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effective mechanisms to meet such challenges in a complex entity – composed 
of a multitude of nations – such as the EC, reflected symptoms similar to those 
of the United States. The American motto E pluribus unum (‘Out of  many, 
one’), like the European “Unity in Diversity” proved that principles were 
primarily historical guideposts rather than universal values. Confronted with 
the violation of the fundamental values of European unity in their own back 
yard, the Europeans, like the Americans, began to slide toward rationalizations 
and demagoguery.
The analogy between the establishment of European unity and preser-
vation of Yugoslav unity (which was advocated by both the EC and the US) 
certainly contributed to the dogma on the necessity of preserving the Yugo-
slav state regardless of the character of its internal relations (coarse human 
rights violations). At a time when Western Europe was celebrating the vision 
of Milan Kundera, who saw the ‘Old Continent’ as a community fundamen-
tally characterized by “maximum diversity in minimum space”, the until-then 
proponents of such a concept in Yugoslavia, such as the Yugoslav ambassador 
to the European Community, Mihailo Crnobrnja, revealed that Yugoslavia was 
“a country of condensed diversity” (“It is very difficult to find another country 
that has so much variety on such a relatively small territory”).56 The “Yugoslav 
paradigm” (“Balkan Babel”) imposed itself as the topical civilizational issue, 
equally relevant to the concept of European integration and to global multicul-
turalism: is diversity a comparative advantage or an undesirable fixed trait? Is 
it possible to align differences, and how, or are they necessarily a destabilizing 
factor (at least when speaking of national interests)? While Crnobrnja pointed 
out that “the Yugoslav drama tells the story of national awakening and the vic-
tory of aggressive nationalism”, Western Europeans, above all the proverbially 
restrained – in such situations – British, began to “sober up” after the great vic-
tory of liberal democracy and capitalism over the communist East.57
The fall of the Berlin Wall also meant the fall of the Iron Curtain and the 
end of the Cold War (which immediately aroused Britain’s concerns).58 This 
event was not only a physical act but also a symbolic demolition of the barrier 
to reintegration of the German nation; East Germany united with the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the prime driver of European unity. The German 
formula, which was a synthesis of rejecting authoritarian communism and 
affirmation of the national unification of a single nation (re)integrated into 
“Europe”, not only prompted questions of an economic nature (the costs of 
absorbing East Germany) but also, as noted by Paul Johnson, an important 
matter of principle: “…if the Prussians and Saxons could be a part of the EC 
56 Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav drama (Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1994), p. 15.
57 See, for example “The end of the Honeymoon”, The Daily Telegraph, 25 Mar. 1991.
58 On this see Timothy Garton Ash, History of the Present- Essays, Sketches and Dispatches from 
Europe in the 1990s (Harmondsworth Middlesex: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999).
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with full rights, how could admission then be denied to other historical Eu-
ropean ethnic communities: the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks, and 
even the Slovenes and Croats, if they wiggle out of Belgrade’s grasp?”59 In 1990, 
the European Community confronted the question of redefining European 
unity. How to align the motive for the united Europe project rooted in shared 
values with the realpolitik motives of integration costs and overcoming the 
democratic deficit in the culture of post-communist states? The question was 
linked to the “the Community’s overall long-term strategy”.60 And while until 
mid-1991 the emergence of democracy in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary yielded change which seemed “fundamental and lasting”, in the 
until then most advanced communist state, Yugoslavia, “the stage was set for 
either civil war or disintegration of the state”.61
The eC and Croatian Independence
“The international community’s reaction to the civil war”, as formulated by 
Alois Mock, “was initially characterized by a mixture of opportunism, igno-
rance, wrong-headed assessments and aimlessness. (…) [I]t seemed that many 
Western politicians would have preferred to deal with the old Yugoslavia, with 
a single, albeit left/fascist, Marxist party – but nonetheless one government 
– and not, suddenly, several states, with several governments and even more 
parties”.62 Such tendencies of realpolitik-motivated adaptation to the path of 
less resistance as “politics as the art of the possible” marked 1991 as a whole. 
The key moves by the international community, led by the EC, generally con-
stituted unsuccessful attempts to keep pace with the outbreak of war, which af-
ter the brief Slovenian episode, moved with full ferocity to Croatia. The Brijuni 
Declaration (July 1991) which arranged for a ceasefire that was not observed 
(and placed a three-month moratorium on the independence of Croatia and 
Slovenia), the initiation of the International Conference on Yugoslavia (Sep-
tember 1991) and the drafting of the so-called Vance Plan (December 1991), 
on which basis UN peacekeeping forces would be deployed in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia, proved to be half-hearted and belated solutions.63 Based 
on simple adaptation to events and an opportunistic attitude toward matters 
59 Paul Johnson, Moderna vremena (Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 2007), p. 
792.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 191.
62 Alois Mock, p. 14.
63 For a chronology of key events in 1991, see Gorazd Nikić, ed., Croatia Between Aggression 
and Peace (Zagreb: AGM, 1994). One of the peace mediators, Lord David Owen, a physician 
by profession, would write that to rein in the Yugoslav crisis (like an advancing disease), timely 
action was key: “… the more serious the symptoms, the greater need for early treatment”. David 
Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Hartcourt Brace and Company, 1995), pp. 122, 342.
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of principle, these moves demonstrated in equal part a desire to settle the con-
flicts in Yugoslavia and a tendency to bypass effective solutions. For the Croats, 
as observed by Patrick Buchanan, “the road to hell” in 1991 was truly “paved 
with good intentions”.
Political equidistance under conditions of escalation of the conflict nec-
essarily led to continuation of the international community’s deceptive con-
cealment of its own inefficacy and, paradoxically, the undercutting of vaunted 
principles. The Croatian enthusiasm for Europe after the announcement of 
democratic change and then the disappointment which followed the West’s in-
difference were lucidly illustrated by Stanko Lasić, a writer and member of the 
Croatian Council of the European Movement: “The Croatian people went into 
the war with enormous confidence in Europe and in the rules of democracy. It 
saw Europe as a natural ally and thus believed that Europe would use the case 
of Croatia to show how it defended the right of peoples to self-determination, 
how it rushed to the aid of those attacked, how it condemned aggressors, how it 
analyzed the historical situation, how it sympathized with suffering”.64 Instead 
of policy which complied its own principles, Lasić highlighted the hypocrisy in 
the statements of European leaders. He therefore noted the statement made by 
European Commission President Jacques Delors, who “standing on his ped-
estal of authority and with false modesty, created this amalgam: ‘History is 
tragic’, ‘destructive forces in it always await in ambush’, ‘and Croatia and Serbia 
are responsible, each in its own way’. (…) ‘At the beginning of the crisis, I re-
ceived, one by one, each of the presidents of the Yugoslav republics, and told 
them: Your independence? I agree. The right to self-determination? I agree. 
But, in line with the Helsinki Charter, are you prepared to respect the rights 
of your minorities, to refrain from changing borders by force, to democratize 
your administrations? The only response I heard was drivel’”. (Le Figaro, Paris, 
June19, 1992).65 Lasić ironically, and caustically, commented on Delors’ obser-
vations: “A masterful amalgam. Everything is mixed together, nobody is guilty, 
all in the same basket. Instead of saying which president wanted to change bor-
ders by force, which president would not democratize his administration, who 
(in principle) does not respect minority rights, Jacques Delors behaved like an 
arrogant bureaucrat who knows that these presidents whom he ‘summoned’ 
and ‘received one by one’ could do nothing to him, so he twisted the facts as he 
pleased just to remove any blame from Europe”.66
Similar resignation was expressed by former Croatian governmental 
minister Božo Udovičić in his notes from November 1991. As opposed to 
Lasić, who concentrated on matters of principle, Udovičić, like many other 
64 Stanko Lasić, Three Essays on Europe (Zagreb: The Croatian Council of  the European Move-
ment, 1992), p. 40.
65 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
66 Ibid., p. 45.
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Croatian officials (including a goodly number of diplomats), dealt with 
revealing “realpolitik” in his considerations:
“The Western powers, with some reserve by Germany, went so far as to 
endorse recognition of the de facto situation. Only a day after the rump 
Yugoslav Presidency demanded the deployment of United Nations forces, 
French President Mitterrand brought up the need to resolve Croatia’s 
‘administrative borders’, which served as an impetus for further Serbian 
conquests. This position was also taken by Lord Carrington, not so 
much in his statements as in his actions. He met with Franjo Tuđman 
perfunctorily, but he was always ‘thick as thieves’ and ‘cooking’ something 
with Milošević and Kadijević. This behaviour by Mitterrand and 
Carrington showed that the Western powers were guided by the principles 
of actual power relations. This is why Croatia had to solve its problems 
mostly on its own in the view of critics of official Croatian policy, to the 
best of its knowledge and capability, because for international players 
the actual state of affairs was more important than the principles they 
verbally proclaimed. Had the Croatian leadership been aware of this from 
the very onset of the aggression, the situation would probably have been 
more favourable at that moment. In a letter, German Foreign Minister 
Hans Dietrich Genscher, Croatia’s great friend, attempted to warn Van 
den Broek, as the president of the European Community’s Council of 
Ministers, of Lord Carrington’s ‘dirty’ game, and expressed dissatisfaction 
(disagreement) with Carrington’s latest ideas which, Genscher claimed, 
did not comply with the European Community’s positions. For by all 
accounts, Lord Carrington had promised the Serbs a referendum at which 
they would decide whether or not to remain in Croatia”.67
Soon it became apparent that Serbia was also exhibiting an equal measure 
of dissatisfaction with the policies of Great Britain and France, and the interna-
tional community as a whole. After consenting to an international conference 
and arbitrage initiated by “friendly” France, Serbia was unpleasantly surprised 
by its outcome (ultimately, the acceptance of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and 
the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics as independent states). This 
was expressed by the Serbian foreign minister of the time, Vladislav Jovanović:
“As for our other allies, such as France, about which there was this legend 
that it has been our permanent friend since the First World War – although 
it’s well known that it charged us for all of the artillery and arms it delivered 
in that war – that was our second disappointment. When, at the beginning 
of the 1990s, Francois Mitterrand summoned Slobodan Milošević for an 
urgent meeting, we believed in their help, but he was obviously deceived, 
because the concept of the International Conference on Yugoslavia 
in 1991 was portrayed as an offer of the European Community’s good 
67 Božo Udovičić, Statisti u demokraciji-Čitanka za buduću povijest (Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 
1999), p. 242.
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services to settle differences between quarrelling brothers. This, however, 
was a subterfuge, because only a few weeks later, Yugoslavia was broken 
apart, and its republics had been granted independence, even though 
Mitterrand did not do this on his own behalf, but rather on behalf of the 
twelve European countries”.68
One of the lasting consequences of the international community’s incon-
sistent conduct toward all parties in Yugoslavia’s collapse was the general loss 
of confidence in international policy and the corresponding institutions. The 
culmination of this process can be tied to the appearance of general displea-
sure among the peoples from the territory of the former Yugoslavia with the 
most important product of international policy, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, a direct consequence 
of European Machiavellianism in the early 1990s was associated with the real-
ization that the international community did not stand behind its principles. 
Confronted with the Machiavellian “acrobatics” of European high politics, 
politicians from the now already former Yugoslavia also discovered realpolitik. 
Disenchantment with “foreign friends” and a loss of trust in international in-
stitutions certainly served as a major catalyst that moved Yugoslav politicians 
to find solutions to their disputes in bilateral manoeuvring. The “unprincipled” 
negotiations between Tuđman, Milošević, Izetbegović and others may also be 
viewed in this light. For the West, however, the appearance of “Balkan Machia-
vellianism” was a welcome excuse which, in the form of dire pronouncements 
about blood-thirsty Balkan peoples, concealed their own inefficacy.
The intensification of warfare in Croatia also heightened the international 
public’s attention. Despite the obvious aggression on the part of Serbia and the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), media descriptions of the character of the war 
in Croatia varied over the autumn of 1991 depending on individual events 
and the affinities of individual journalists. For international observers, a key 
difference between the approaches of Tuđman and Milošević to the nation 
was epitomized by their political rhetoric. Since the very beginning of his 
“nationalistic” career, Milošević demonstrated a talent for political flexibility 
and mimicry (concealing his true objectives).69 At the height of Serbian/
Yugoslav army attacks on targets in Croatia, Milošević announced that “during 
these changes the equality of the Yugoslav peoples must be respected”. At the 
same time, in line with the popular – in the West – view of Serbia as the Balkan 
‘Piedmont’ and the unanimous calls to preserve multinational Yugoslavia, he 
announced that “We Serbs will save this country!”70 On the other hand, the 
68 Vesna Duka, Tanja Šikanić, “Intervju s Vladislavom Jovanovićem: Povampirivanje prošlosti 
nije u interesu naroda”, Nezavisne novine, 10 Jan. 2009.
69 Just how good Milošević was at this was later acknowledged by Lawrence Eagleburger, the 
US Secretary of State in 1991: “All of my assessments of him were wrong”. “’Ja sam najveća 
naivčina na svijetu: Milošević me potpuno zaludio’”, Globus, 15 Dec. 2006.
70 Interview with Milošević by Ingrid Badurina, “Milošević: ‘Mi Srbi ćemo spasiti ovu zemlju’”, 
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Croatian president’s statements often bewildered or even appalled journalists 
and diplomats who found it difficult to comprehend his historical lectures and 
particularly his notions of state-building. Something that became immediately 
notable was that in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tuđman sought for 
the Croats what he denied the Serbs in Croatia.71 Thus, for example, US 
Ambassador Thomas Pickering told Prime Minister Franjo Gregurić “that the 
United States government has authorized me to convey dismay over Tuđman’s 
idea (…) on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a permanent and just 
solution”.72 The heritage of the Independent State of Croatia (the World War 
II Quisling state) together with Greater Serbian propaganda also took its toll, 
particularly among journalists not particularly fond of Croatia, and Croatia’s 
state-building aspirations were brought into question.73 Even though, as 
observed by Sabrina P. Ramet, “one cannot say that ethnarchy and the concept 
of nation states are atavisms”, the very idea of a state-building nation (in the 
case of Serbia the ‘Piedmont’ of Yugoslavia; in the case of Croatia the tradition 
of the statehood right in an “ethnic and historical” territory) was perceived 
in the West as “antidemocratic and anti-liberal”, subject to the belief that “it 
must be avoided as a condition for any aspiration to move in the direction of a 
liberal democratic state”.74
Despite the international community’s general aversion to the “ethnic 
confrontations” in Yugoslavia, as the conflicts were characterized by Francois 
Mitterrand, it was becoming increasingly apparent “which side in the conflict” 
was conducting ethnic cleansing, as pointed out by French historian Paul 
Garde – citing the Belgrade newspaper Borba of 6 December 1991 (carried in 
Le Monde) – “Serbian reservists recruited into the federal army were sometimes 
disgusted with the role they had to play, and which consisted of paving the way 
for the insurgents who were perpetrating atrocities: (…) ‘When we liberate 
some Croatian village, the units of Martić (the ‘internal affairs minister’ and 
chief of the Krajina insurgents), Chetniks and other territorial troops come 
after us and loot, rape and slaughter. (…) We can no longer take moral 
responsibility for the atrocities in which we did not participate and which we 
Borba, 13 July 1991, reprinted in La Stampa (Turin).
71 Tuđman’s advisor and later diplomat Mario Nobilo said of this: “Unfortunately, on most in-
terlocutors he left the impression of a provincial politician, hopelessly submerged in historicism, 
unyielding in the defence of his views, with no sense of humour and an authoritarian style. But 
they never saw him as weak, rather simply as a personality ill-suited to the post-modern time 
in which he lived”. Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks-Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990.-
1997. (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2000), p. 109.
72 Mario Nobilo, p. 157.
73 See, for example, Robert D. Kaplan, “Croatianism: The latest Balkan ugliness”, The New Re-
public, 25 Nov. 1991. See also Mario Nobilo, 197.
74 Sabrina P. Ramet, Čija demokracija?..., p. 80.
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attempted to prevent’”.75 the siege of Vukovar and Dubrovnik, which prompted 
many prominent Croatian and international personalities to speak out in their 
defence,76 and the continued depictions of human suffering prompted changes 
in public opinion.77 Some of the world’s most influential journalists began 
to publicly express their disapproval, equally revolted by events in Croatia 
and Yugoslavia and the attitude of the international community. Thus, The 
New York Times lead editorialist Anthony Lewis stated: “Among the epochal 
international events of 1991, there was one unambiguous disaster. What 
happened in Yugoslavia has been a tragedy for its people and a monumental 
political failure for the United States and the European Community”.78 the 
senseless aggression was reflected in public opinion, reinforcing the Croatian 
position in the otherwise divided Europe; “with European public opinion 
increasingly sympathetic to Croatian self-determination”, the Croatian 
government became increasingly optimistic that the internationalization 
of the Yugoslav crisis would also result in the international recognition of 
Croatia’s statehood.79 However, despite engendering a more realistic picture of 
the nature of the conflict in Yugoslavia, pushed forward by a group of Croatian 
and French intellectuals,80 hesitancy concerning Croatia’s independence 
continued to preoccupy international peace mediators, especially those from 
official French and British circles.
A shift in the international community’s position to the ongoing Yugoslav 
crisis came with an initiative by a group of states that decided to halt the erosion 
75 Paul Garde, Život i smrt Jugoslavije (Zagreb: Ceres, 1996), p. 318.
76 The involvement of respected Croatian intellectuals had great importance in the promotion 
of Croatian objectives and particularly in fostering an understanding of the nature of the Cro-
atian-Serbian conflict. The role of Dubrovnik (“an ancient city which for a thousand years has 
preserved its freedom though surrounded by powerful forces”) as one of the world centres for 
the promotion of the anti-war Pugwash Group was underlined by Ivan Supek together with the 
members of the Croatian Pugwash Group in the journal Encyclopedia moderna. In their appeal 
(July 9, 1991) addressed to their “Dear Pugwash Friends,” they condemned the “neo-Stalinist 
regime of Serbia” and warned that the “the new association of free Europe cannot be created 
by insisting on preservation of political entities created in the past for various reasons, entities 
which did not fulfil the expectations and interests of their people”. “Dear Pugwash Friends”, 
(Ivan Supek and Paolo Budinich, eds.), Encyclopedia Moderna 36, Year XII, (1991): 44-45. The 
same journal also contained older reports on the organization of a Pugwash symposium in Du-
brovnik on “Science and Ethics” (1975) and “The Dubrovnik-Philadelphia Statement” (1976) 
which “also incorporates material from a report entitled Humanistic Morality”. See Ibid., pp. 
157-160, 181-186. The appeal from roughly one hundred Nobel laureates calling for an end to 
the aggression against Croatia was published in The New York Times, 14 Jan. 1992.
77 Strobe Talbot, “Fiddling While Dubrovnik Burns”, Time, November 25 1991.
78 Anthony Lewis, “The Killing Goes On”, The New York Times, December 20, 1991. See also 
Anthony Lewis, “Where Is the Outrage”, The New York Times, November 4, 1991. 
79 Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds-The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Westview Press, Bolder-San 
Francisco-Oxford, 1993), p. 232.
80 Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara, Neven Šimac, Etničko čišćenje - Povijesni dokumenti o jednoj 
srpskoj ideologiji (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 1993).
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of the European Community’s integrity. Even though an important role in this 
shift was played by Austria, the Vatican and individual transition countries 
(such as Lithuania, Ukraine and Czechoslovakia),81 the most important role 
was played by Germany. The causes of this German turnaround can be seen in 
the realistic assessment that the Croats would manage to resist the aggression 
mounted by Serbia, Montenegro and the JNA, and acknowledgement of the 
fact that through the prism of integrity Germany would impose itself as an 
international leader that would (at least in Europe) fill in the vacuum created 
after the American ‘pullout’. However, even though Germany did indeed play 
a major role in Croatia’s international recognition, it did not support the 
collapse of the Yugoslav state a priori. As noted by Geert Ahrens, “initially, 
Bonn had tried, like the United States, to ‘combine support for unity and 
territorial integrity with the request for respect for democracy’, but then gave 
preference to democracy and self-determination of the republics over unity 
of the SFRJ”.82 The same conclusion was reached by historian and political 
scientist Michael Libal, who was head of the South-east Europe Department 
in the German Foreign Ministry from 1991 to 1995, where he dealt with the 
Yugoslav crisis. “Until June 1991, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher was neither overly concerned nor preoccupied with the crisis 
in Yugoslavia”, and “the primary reason being the good, if not excellent, 
relations between Bonn and Belgrade, which Genscher in particular had been 
cultivating since the early 1970s”.83 Genscher continued on the foundations 
laid by the German chancellor of the time, Willy Brandt, with whom he 
shared a sensitivity to national issues in Yugoslavia.84 However, after it became 
apparent, as formulated by “one of the leading foreign policy experts from the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the vice-president of his party’s 
parliamentary group, Norbert Gansel”, that this was “a serious political crisis, 
which is bringing Yugoslavia to the brink of civil war”, a major change of course 
was made.85 Gansel put forth a direct demand to the European Community 
for the development of a new approach and emphasized “that the EC should 
forsake the stereotypical emphasis on the unity of Yugoslavia and acknowledge 
that the idea of a ‘democratic, unified Yugoslavia’ has actually been, since the 
beginning, a fiction”.86 This initiative resulted in ratification of a resolution in 
the Bundestag on 19 June 1991 following a motion endorsed by the Christian 
Democrats, the Free Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Greens.
81 On Croatia’s international recognition, see Mario Nobilo, 127-207.
82 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), p. 935. Based on Geert-Hin-
rich Ahrens, p. 41.
83 Michael Libal, Njemačka politika i jugoslavenska kriza 1991.-1992. (Zagreb: Golden 
marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2004), p. 16; in 1995 and 1996, Libal was a fellow at Harvard Uni-
versity’s Center for International Affairs.
84 Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten 1960-1975 (Munich/Zürich, 1978), pp. 575., 628.
85 Michael Libal, p. 18.
86 Ibid., p. 18.
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The fundamental idea underlying the resolution was the democratic prin-
ciple of self-determination as an alternative to the opportunism of realpolitik, 
particularly as exhibited by the US, which was following the path of least re-
sistance by blindly upholding the Yugoslav option despite clear indications of 
its transformation into some kind of Greater Serbia. As noted by Libal, “given 
the absence of accord on the existing foundation of the state, an agreement had 
to be reached on a new foundation: democracy, pluralism and the rule of law 
throughout Yugoslavia had to guarantee the exercise of the right to self-deter-
mination. (…) The EC must actively assist the Yugoslavs in finding mutually 
acceptable bonds between the republics, and thus reward a Yugoslavia restored 
on these lines with EC membership. Any use of force had to be opposed”.87
In early July 1991, at the onset of the aggression against Croatia waged 
by Serbia and the JNA, Genscher, while condemning the intervention of the 
Yugoslav military leadership, emphasized that the framework for the renewal 
of dialogue in Yugoslavia should be the “European constitution” – the Paris 
Charter of 1990. Genscher underscored the “fundamental principles of this 
Constitution” as “the right to autonomous decision-making, human rights, 
minority rights, and democracy” and stressed that these principles exclude 
“the rule of one over others”. In early December of that same year, in the dra-
matic period after the fall of Vukovar and the siege of Dubrovnik, the Ger-
man foreign minister concluded that “Yugoslavia no longer exists” and further 
stressed: “Yugoslavia was not destroyed by the caprice of those nations that 
want their independence, nor by the conduct of the outside world, but by the 
war of the Yugoslav People’s Army against Croatia and the dreams of foreign 
political powers of a Greater Serbia and the suppression of minority rights in 
Kosovo”. Announcing Germany’s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia prior to 
Christmas, Genscher stated: “We Germans want peace and friendship with all 
Yugoslav peoples”; here he stressed that Germany “in the future will stand on 
the side of human rights, minority rights and the right to self-determination, 
and will oppose aggression and oppression”.88 Chancellor Helmut Kohl was 
similarly unambiguous. Conveying support “to the democratically elected 
governments in Slovenia and Croatia and their efforts to gain freedom and 
independence”, Kohl did not neglect to note Germany’s openness to all peoples 
who respect principled values: “For we Germans, this is a matter of the fate of 
people, their future in peace, freedom and democracy – and nothing else”.89 
Despite the euphoria which ensued in Croatia when Germany’s support result-
ed in the international recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence by 
the European ‘twelve’ (even a song was written entitled ‘Danke Deutchland’),90 
German politicians avoided any excessive expressions of affinity – not without 
87 Ibid., p. 19.
88 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Komentari (Zagreb: Otvoreno sveučilište, 1996), pp. 40, 50, 51.
89 Based on Mario Nobilo, p. 166.
90 Laura Silber & Allan Little, p. 195.
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reason as it transpired.91 Thus, Genscher personally responded to the publica-
tion of Stjepan Mesić’s political memoirs which bore the original title “How 
We Brought Down Yugoslavia”: Genscher discretely pointed out that “Europe 
would not find this title the most acceptable”, and Mesić changed it to “How 
Yugoslavia Collapsed”.92
In Serbia, German support for Croatia and Slovenia was seen as an 
imperial expansion of the “Fourth Reich” in which Germany had the backing 
of the United States.93 More serious analyses showed that the character of 
this new constellation of relations in the international community in which 
the United States and Germany were assessed as states that “switched” their 
previous positions. A month after the international recognition of Croatia 
and Slovenia on 15 January 1992, American expert Patrick Glynn (from the 
American Enterprise Institute) pointed out, like many other analysts,94 that 
“in the end the Yugoslav crisis did more than create two new states: it marked 
the re-emergence of Germany as a great power”. According to Glynn, “It was 
an ironic reversal of roles. Throughout the 1980s, when the United States 
pursued tough tactics against communist leaders, based on a commitment 
to democratic principles, West Germany steered a neutral middle path 
between East and West based on realpolitik. Now the Germans were acting 
from principle against a dictator [Slobodan Milošević] while the United States 
cultivated realpolitik. (…) It was … a measure of the declining power of the 
United States”.95 Glynn concluded his analysis with a historical assessment of 
Germany’s ‘American’ message to the US: “One of the great lessons of the 1980s 
was that those countries fared best in the global power struggle that stood 
firmly for their principles. In the 1990s, returning to Kissingerian ideas of 
stability, the United States eschewed such a course. The result was not merely a 
botched opportunity amid an unnecessary loss of lives, but an absolute loss of 
international power for the United States”.96
91 On this Mario Nobilo noted: “Croatian politics, from the euphoric phase of ‘Danke Deutch-
land’ to disappointment and the public lynching of Klaus Kinkel in the pro-regime press – 
passed through an entire cycle of relations with Germany, which ran hot and cold. Zagreb made 
a mistake at the onset by constantly referring to its powerful patron. This spurred malicious 
historical analogies, damaged Germany’s international reputation and limited its ability to help 
us (…) Bonn, for its part, based on its own principles and image, was often compelled to criticize 
Zagreb in its own name and on Europe’s behalf, which did not please official political circles in 
Croatia”. Mario Nobilo, p. 168.
92 “Intervju Stjepan Mesić: Vrijeme je da se raspusti HOS”, Nova Matica (1992), no. 7: 7.
93 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada (Belgrade: Politika izdavačka delatnost, 1993), pp. 
6-7.
94 John Tagliabue, “The New Germans: ‘Dwarfs’ No More”, The New York Times, December 15, 
1991
95 Patrick Glynn, “Yugoblunder”, The New Republic, 24 Feb. 1992.
96 Ibid.
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Parallel to the German initiative, which was wholeheartedly assisted by the 
Vatican and Austria,97 Croatian aspirations for independence were also legiti-
mated at the peace conference in The Hague. The commission established un-
der the auspices of this international conference on Yugoslavia (the so-called 
Badinter Commission) – “an offshoot of the highest international factors, an 
emanation of the European Union (then the European Community) and the 
UN” – meant the reaffirmation of the rule of law as opposed to horse trading 
based on realpolitik (which aroused the ire of the Serbs).98 Even though the 
idea to establish international arbitration was “launched by France (in which 
the idea of independence for Croatia and Slovenia was not highly regarded) 
at the end of summer and early autumn 1991”, it became apparent that the 
question of separating politics from jurisprudence (a concept unclear to Ser-
bian Foreign Minister Jovanović) was nonetheless a significant civilizational 
achievement. The actual arbitrage procedure validated general values through 
the application of international law to the former Yugoslavia.99 The commis-
sion’s verdict was “a binding legal opinion for the EU, the UN, for all republics 
of the former Yugoslavia, even though some of them did not observe it”. The 
disproportion in activities on the part of engaged international community 
diplomats led by Lord Carrington at the International Conference on Yugo-
slavia and representatives of “the interested Republics of Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia” revealed, as stated by Neven Šimac, “a 
very serious problem: a lack of political dynamics among those with a vital in-
terest in the judgement on the death of Yugoslavia”. According to Šimac, “small 
and weak states need to adhere to law and justice, while the countries attacked 
in wars have not sufficiently employed this vital and potent weapon. They al-
lowed themselves to be drawn exclusively to confrontations in the military, 
political and diplomatic theatres, and thus be ‘extradited’ to the callous inter-
national diplomatic arena in which, as young emerging states, they initially 
had no prospects of any significant victories”.100
97 It is interesting to note that at Versailles in 1918, the Vatican defended the preservation of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, while in 1990 it stood with Germany and Austria as the most prominent 
lobbyist for Croatian and Slovenian independence and an advocate of the right of nations to 
self-determination.
98 The Badinter Commission operated from the end of November 1991 to mid-August 1993. 
It released binding arbitrage opinions on the application of international law in the case of the 
former Yugoslavia, and also dealt with the legal implications of referenda, decisions and voting 
by the public in these countries. During its work it released a total of fifteen opinions, one inter-
locutory decision, and one preliminary opinion.
99 Klara Kovačević, “Smrt Jugoslavije, uzroci, posljedice, pouke – Intervju s Nevenom Šimcem”, 
Matica - časopis hrvatske matice iseljenika (1996), no. 6: 12.
100 Ibid., p. 13.
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Realpolitik and the Recognition of Croatian Statehood
With ten years of hindsight, Norman Cigar, an American professor of mili-
tary history at the Marine Corps University in Quantico (Virginia) and the au-
thor of one of the most thorough-going books on the disintegration of Yugosla-
via, spoke about the circumstances surrounding the international recognition 
of Croatia’s independence.101 When the European Community member states, 
and many others, recognized the independence of the Republic of Croatia on 
15 January 1992, this “diplomatic recognition was, among other things, also an 
expression of acceptance of the military status quo which existed at the time 
in Croatia”. He went on to say that “in January 1992 it was obvious that in the 
military sense Croatia had survived and in control of most of its territory. The 
international community would have found it difficult, for example, to restore 
the status of a year before”.102 In other words, the international community had 
conceded the “situation in the field”, without a “superfluous” re-examination 
of the “justification” (or “lack thereof ”) for Croatia’s policies. Only six months 
earlier – in the summer of 1991 – “the international community predicted an 
entirely different outcome in Croatia. For it expected a rapid victory by the 
Yugoslav army and Croatia’s defeat”.103
Cigar assessed the change in the international community’s position as an 
act of “realistic” adaptation to unfolding events (which could have been radi-
cally different) rather than in a consistent policy of upholding the principles 
and values enshrined in international charters and instruments which regu-
lated the key points of international relations. Between principle and realpo-
litik, realpolitik carried the day. The paradox of Croatian independence was 
reflected in the international community’s turn to realpolitik in acknowledging 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the establishment of a military balance 
between Croatia and Slovenia and the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries at the 
end of 1991, in the same way that under the auspices of the UN, it imposed an 
unselective arms embargo on the entire territory of Yugoslavia at the height of 
the escalating conflict, thereby practically openly siding with Serbia and the 
JNA in the expectation of a rapid defeat of the “secessionists”. The question 
of the orientation of individual protagonists in the Yugoslav drama vis-à-vis 
democracy, human rights and market economics were vital aspects of legiti-
macy, but still ancillary factors. Moreover, all means were used to rationalize 
and superficially interpret the outcome as a historical inevitability, wherein the 
dubious reputation of the Balkans was not without a role.
To a certain degree, Cigar’s assessments correspond to Franjo Tuđman’s 
observations on the role of the correlation of principle and realpolitik in 
101 Intervju Bojana Klime s Normanom Cigarom, “Pogrešne procjene, pogrešna politika”, VOA, 
cited in Vjesnik, 16 Jan. 2002.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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Croatia’s relations with the international community. In a speech delivered in 
1994, Tuđman said: “The arduous experience of the Croatian nation throughout 
its history, and particularly the most recent years of restoration of Croatian 
statehood, have taught us that not one of the lofty principles contained 
in the Charter of the United Nations and in international law is either 
automatically actionable and even less guaranteed if a nation does not possess 
the resolve to exercise it; if a nation is not prepared to endure heavy sacrifices 
in achieving its own right to life and freedom; if its strength and its decisions 
cannot align its national interests with the vital interests of the international 
community”.104 During the period of his political ascendancy at the turn of 
the 1980s into the 1990s, Tuđman formulated his policies on the basis of 
compromises to align Croatian interests with international requirements, 
which was exceptionally important to the internationalization of the Yugoslav 
crisis.105 The principle of self-determination of nations to which he referred 
was an integral component of his political reasoning. However, regardless 
of the references to principle and rights – wherein he sometimes created the 
impression of a “fervent revolutionary” – Tuđman was not a captive to the 
realm of ideas, but rather a realist – an unyielding statesman, who adapted 
principles to his political views without any notable qualms.106
One consequence of his, basically ideological, focus on achieving objec-
tives (wherein ideas such as self-determination or democratic principles were 
primarily a means to an end) was that he cast aside any illusions on the prin-
cipled conduct of the international community:
“Regardless of the inalienable right of the Croatian nation – which is one 
of the oldest European nations – to self-determination and the restoration 
of its own state, regardless of the patently barbaric aggression aimed at 
territorial conquest, genocidal expulsions of peoples and destruction of 
the most valuable cultural monuments of the Croatian nation, such as 
Vukovar and Dubrovnik, the Croats were never granted the right to self-
determination. They never would have secured the right to their own 
state, to freedom and independence, had they not been prepared to endure 
heavy losses in human lives and treasure to achieve these objectives, had 
they not demonstrated a powerful will to statehood which they resolutely 
imposed as a member of the international community, simultaneously 
manifesting a willingness to be a constructive factor in the creation of a 
new global order in place of the old, unsustainable and failed system”.107
104  “Tuđmanove pobjedničke bitke za Hrvatsku”, at: http://www.camo.ch/tudjmanove_bitke.htm.
105 On this see Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds-The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, San 
Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), p. 232.
106 On this see Albert Bing, “Franjo Tuđman i samoodređenje naroda.”
107 Ibid.
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Die staatliche verselbständigung Kroatiens: zwischen Prinzipien 
und Realpolitik
Zusammenfassung
Das Verhältnis zwischen “Realpolitik” und “Prinzipien” wird im Kontext 
der staatlichen Verselbständigung Kroatiens, beziehungsweise des Zerfalls 
Jugoslawiens, auf zwei Ebenen betrachtet. Die erste Ebene bezieht sich auf 
die außerordentlich komplexe Problematik des Charakters internationaler 
Beziehungen und auf das Verhältnis der internationalen Gemeinschaft zur 
geopolitischen Fragmentierung Jugoslawiens zu Beginn der 90-er Jahre 
des 20. Jahrhunderts. Auf der zweiten Ebene behandelt man die Frage der 
Prädispositionen der kroatischen intellektuellen und politischen Elite, um 
qualitativ ebenso komplexe Implikationen des Prozesses der staatlichen 
Verselbstständigung zu erkennen und zu verstehen. Diese Arbeit wurde als 
eine historisch-politologische Studie konzipiert. 
